Abstract-This paper analyzes the optimal investment strategy for lossaverse investors, assuming a complete market and general Ito processes for the asset prices. The loss-averse investor follows a partial portfolio insurance strategy. When the investor's planning horizon is short (less than 5 years), he or she considerably reduces the initial portfolio weight of stocks compared to an investor with smooth power utility. The empirical section of the paper estimates the level of loss aversion implied by historical U.S. stock market data, using a representative agent model. We find that loss aversion and risk aversion cannot be disentangled empirically.
I. Introduction
L OSS aversion refers to the phenomenon that decisionmakers are distinctly more sensitive to losses than to gains. This phenomenon introduces a kink in the utility function (that is, a jump in marginal utility) at the reference point distinguishing gains from losses. Loss aversion plays a central role in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and is supported by a wealth of experimental evidence (see, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) .
A number of recent papers study the effect of loss aversion in financial economics (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang, & Santos 2001; Gomes, 2005) . Benartzi and Thaler (1995) demonstrate that loss aversion offers a potential explanation for the equity premium puzzle. A large part of the population does not invest in stocks (see, for example, Mankiw & Zeldes, 1991) . By contrast, standard portfolio optimization models prescribe a substantial allocation to stocks, given the historically large equity premium, unless the risk aversion parameter is extremely high (Mehra & Prescott, 1985) . Benartzi and Thaler argue that people are reluctant to invest in stocks due to the combination of loss aversion and a short planning horizon: the pain experienced when stocks perform poorly overshadows the payoff of positive stock returns in the short term. Barberis et al. (2001) consider loss aversion in a multiperiod context, where investors update the reference point through time, and argue that sluggish updating rules might explain the equity premium puzzle. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. (2001) use numerical techniques to solve for the portfolios of lossaverse investors, and Gomes (2005) provides an exact solution in a model with two states of the world at the planning horizon. We extend these results to closed-form solutions in a more general setting. Specifically, we derive the optimal payoff at the planning horizon for loss-averse investors, assuming a complete market and general Ito processes for the asset prices. Given a constant Sharpe ratio and a constant interest rate, we present closed-form expressions for the portfolio weights of loss-averse investors. We also consider a dynamic updating rule for the reference point, similar to Barberis et al. (2001) and Gomes (2005) , and analyze its effect on the investment decisions of lossaverse investors.
In our analysis we consider two different utility functions with loss aversion. First, we consider a concave kinked power function. Second, we consider the two-piece power function used in prospect theory. In contrast to the concave kinked power function, the utility function of prospect theory is convex for wealth below the reference point, leading to risk-seeking behavior. We derive the optimal investment strategies for both types of utility and compare these with the myopic investment strategy of an investor with constant relative risk aversion (that is, smooth concave power utility). Moreover, we compare the strategies of loss-averse investors with portfolio insurance (see Leland, 1980) . Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate that the loss aversion parameter for the utility function of prospect theory is equal to 2.25, after analyzing the choices of a group of individuals facing hypothetical decision problems. Still, a valid question is whether an estimate from lab experiments is relevant at the aggregate level of financial markets. To answer this question we use a simple one-period representative agent model, which allows us to estimate the aggregate level of loss aversion implied by historical U.S. stock market data. We find that the implied level of loss aversion is quite close to the value reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , as long as the curvature (risk aversion) of the utility function is sufficiently low. Joint generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of the level of risk aversion and loss aversion reveals that these two concepts are substitutes, which can not be disentangled based on the U.S. stock market data studied in this paper.
The preferences of loss-averse decisionmakers have the property of first-order risk aversion (Segal & Spivak, 1990) due to the kink in the utility function at the reference point. Roughly speaking, first-order risk aversion means that the decisionmaker is sensitive to small deviations around the reference point. We would like to point out that first-order risk aversion also arises in nonexpected utility models that allow for subjective probability distortion (Yaari, 1987; Gul, 1991) . Epstein and Zin (1990) explain a substantial part of the equity premium within the non-expected-utility model of Yaari (1987) , while assuming a standard power utility function. Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2000) calculate the optimal portfolio weights for the non-expected-utility model of Gul (1991) and find that investors become more reluctant to invest in stocks as their level of first-order risk aversion increases. Our results are consistent with these findings: first-order risk aversion introduced by loss aversion also reduces investment in stocks.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we derive the optimal payoff of loss-averse investors at the planning horizon, for general asset price distributions and assuming a complete market. Section III provides closed-form solutions for the optimal portfolio weights under the assumption of log normal asset returns. We also introduce a dynamic updating rule for the reference point and analyze its effect on the optimal solutions. Additionally, we investigate whether the initial portfolio weight of stocks of loss-averse investors increases with the planning horizon. Section IV empirically estimates the degree of loss aversion and risk aversion implied by U.S. equity market data, assuming that the market portfolio is optimal for a representative agent in a 1-period model. Finally, section V presents the conclusions of the paper.
II. Investments under Loss Aversion

A. The Economy
We start by defining our economy and the dynamic investment problem. We consider a finite-horizon [0, T] economy. 1 We assume that the investor trades K ϩ 1 assets continuously in a market without transaction costs. The zeroth asset is a riskless money market account S 0 (t):
The prices of the remaining assets S(t) ϭ {S k (t)} k ϭ 1 K follow Ito processes with drift rate k (t) and volatility k (t):
where the interest rate r(⅐), the drift rates (⅐), and the volatility matrix (⅐) are adapted processes (possibly pathdependent). In order to meet his investment goals, the investor chooses a portfolio consisting of the K risky assets and the riskless money market account. We denote the fraction invested in risky asset k at time t by w k (t), and the fraction invested in the riskless asset at t by w 0 (t). For any selffinancing portfolio the wealth W(t) of the investor at time t can be expressed as the following stochastic process (using vector notation):
where we substituted w 0 (t) ϭ 1 Ϫ ⌺ i w i (t), and denotes a K ϫ 1 vector of 1's. The initial wealth of the investor is denoted by W 0 : ϭ W(0). We assume that the investor aims to maximize the expected utility of his wealth W(T) at the planning horizon T:
where U(⅐) : ℜ 1 3 ℜ 1 is an increasing utility function. In order to facilitate the solution of the investor's optimal portfolio choice problem, markets are assumed to be complete. Market completeness implies the existence of a unique state price density (or pricing kernel) (t), given by
where Z(t) denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of a change of probability measure defined by
and (t) ϭ Ϫ1 (t) [(t) Ϫ r(t)] denotes the market price of risk process. Note that (t) is an invertible matrix, as we assume that markets are complete. Alternatively, we may write the state price density process as
The state price density specifies the price of a security that pays off 1 unit of wealth in one particular state of the world at time T and 0 in other states, divided by the probability of that particular state.
B. Loss-Averse Preferences
One of the standard assumptions in the theory of optimal portfolio choice and asset pricing is that the utility function U(W(T)) is a strictly increasing, smooth, and concave function over terminal wealth W(T). It is well known that this preference assumption leads to optimal portfolios with a large fraction of stocks, unless the risk aversion coefficient is rather high or the equity premium is set considerably lower than empirical estimates based on historical stock market returns. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) conducted experiments to observe how people make decisions under uncertainty and have proposed an alternative framework, known as prospect theory. The experiments demonstrated that losses loom larger than gains: the negative feeling associated with a loss is typically larger than the pleasure associated with an equivalent gain. Hence, the majority of respondents were loss-averse. The experiments also demonstrated that most respondents were risk-averse when they had to decide about gambles involving gains, but risk-seeking when they had to make a decision about potential losses.
Based on these results and a number of similar experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed the following utility function, which is defined over gains and losses relative to the reference point :
In this expression W denotes wealth. The restrictions A ␥ 1 Ͼ 0 and B ␥ 2 Ͼ 0 are required to ensure that U(W) is an increasing function, A Ͼ B has to hold for loss aversion, and 0 Ͻ ␥ 1 Յ 1, 0 Ͻ ␥ 2 Ͻ 1 for the convex-concave shape. Apart from loss aversion and risk seeking for losses, another element of prospect theory is subjective probability distortion. Experimental evidence suggests that decisionmakers subjectively distort the true return distribution and they use subjective decision weights that overweight or underweight the true probabilities (see, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ). We will not use subjective decision weights in this paper, as our main objective is to study the impact of different loss-averse utility specifications on portfolio choice.
Based on the outcomes of further experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate the parameters of the utility function (8) as A ϭ 2.25, B ϭ 1, and ␥ 1 ϭ ␥ 2 ϭ 0.88. Figure  1 displays the utility function of prospect theory for these estimated parameter values. The utility function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has two properties that are not shared by strictly concave functions: the utility function is partly convex, and it has a kink at the reference point . The kink leads to first-order risk aversion in the preferences of the decisionmaker (Segal & Spivak, 1990) . Roughly speaking, first-order risk aversion means that the decisionmaker is sensitive to small deviations around the reference point .
In order to isolate the effect of first-order risk aversion on decisionmaking, we also consider a concave power utility function with a kink at the reference point :
where W denotes wealth. The restriction ␥ Ͻ 1 has to hold to impose risk aversion, both for losses and for gains, and A Ͼ B is required for loss aversion. In the special case ␥ ϭ 1 the function is piecewise linear, similar to the utility function of prospect theory with ␥ 1 ϭ ␥ 2 ϭ 1.
C. Methodology for Solving the Portfolio Choice Problem
We will derive the optimal wealth profile of the investor at the investment horizon T with the martingale methodology (Cox & Huang, 1989; Karatzas, Lehoczky, & Shreve, 1987; Pliska, 1986) . The optimal wealth profile provides insight into the structure of the optimal strategy, without specifying the portfolio weights. In the next section we will calculate explicit portfolio weights in the case where asset prices follow geometric Brownian motions with a constant interest rate and a constant market price of risk.
In a complete market, the investor can create a unique Arrow-Debreu security for each state of the world, which pays off 1 if a particular state occurs at time T, and 0 otherwise. The main idea of the martingale method is that solving the dynamic optimal portfolio choice problem (4) is equivalent to choosing an optimal portfolio of ArrowDebreu securities, that is, the desired payoff W(T) in each state of the world at time T:
The static problem only includes a nonnegativity constraint on terminal wealth, as the assumption of complete markets, a constant opportunity set, and the absence of exogenous sources of income ensures that the optimal level of wealth will never reach 0 before time T (Cox & Huang, 1989) . The solution of the static problem (10) for loss-averse utility functions in the appendix follows the steps of the method implemented by Basak and Shapiro (2001) to solve nonstandard dynamic problems, in particular with nonconcave and nondifferentiable features. Unlike in the setting of Basak and Shapiro (2001) , these nonstandard features stem directly from the objective. Although nonconcave objectives have been examined in other papers (see, for example, Carpenter, 2000) , our setting is distinct in its focus on utility functions with the property of loss aversion.
D. Wealth Profile for Kinked Power Utility
In order to study the effect of loss aversion without the additional effect of risk-seeking behavior for losses, we derive the optimal wealth profile for the kinked power utility function:
Proposition 1
The time T optimal wealth of a loss-averse investor with a kinked power utility function (9), risk aversion ␥ Ͻ 1, and loss aversion ratio A/B Ͼ 1 is
where ϭ B y
␥Ϫ1
, ϭ A y
, and y Ն 0 satisfies
We can prove that the terminal wealth profile has the following properties: Proposition 2 Consider a loss-averse investor with kinked power utility function (9), ␥ Ͻ 1, and loss aversion ratio A/B Ͼ 1. Let and denote the breakpoints of his optimal wealth profile, and let y denote the corresponding Lagrange multiplier (see proposition 1).
(i) Suppose that the investor's level of loss aversion increases to A* Ͼ A. Let * and * denote the breakpoints of his new optimal wealth profile, and let y* denote the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. Then * Ϫ * Ͼ Ϫ and y* Ͼ y. (ii) Suppose that the investor's initial wealth increases to W 0 * Ͼ W 0 . Then * Ϫ * Ͼ Ϫ , * Ͼ , * Ͼ , and y* Ͻ y.
In figure 2 we display the optimal terminal wealth of a loss-averse investor with kinked power utility, given T ϭ 1 and ϭ W 0 ϭ 1. The preference parameters used for the example are ␥ ϭ 0.88 and A/B ϭ 2.25, based on Tversky and Kahneman (1992); we assume r ϭ 4.08%, ϭ 0.30, and ϭ 22% for the return process, using estimates of Ang et al. (2000) .
As a benchmark, the figure also shows the optimal wealth of an investor with smooth power utility. This investor has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) equal to 1 Ϫ ␥ and always invests a fixed fraction of his wealth in stocks. For further comparisons, figure 2 also displays the wealth of a portfolio insurer with HARA utility
and initial wealth W 0 Ն exp(ϪrT). The portfolio insurer keeps his wealth at time T above the threshold . He achieves this by fully investing in the risk-free asset whenever his intermediate wealth approaches W(t) ϭ exp(ϪrT). We refer to Leland (1980) and Basak (1995) for the optimal policies of portfolio insurers.
Proposition 1 and figure 2 show that the optimal wealth profile for kinked power utility is similar to the benchmark CRRA case in good states of the world with low pricing kernel (T). In intermediate states between and , wealth is at the threshold , as in a portfolio insurance strategy. In very bad states with high pricing kernel, optimal wealth for kinked power utility approaches 0 gradually. Note that the loss-averse investor gives up some wealth in good states of the world (compared to a benchmark CRRA agent) in order to finance his partial portfolio insurance strategy.
Proposition 2 shows that an increase of the level of loss aversion (A* Ͼ A) leads to an expansion of the region with terminal wealth equal to . This increase is accompanied by a reduction of the payoff in good states of the world, as y* Ͼ y. Proposition 2 also demonstrates that portfolio insurance is a normal good for loss-averse investors with a kinked power utility function. As initial wealth increases, the number of states with terminal wealth equal to grows, as does the wealth in all other states (y* Ͻ y).
E. Wealth Profile for Loss Aversion
Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal wealth profile of a loss-averse investor maximizing the utility function of prospect theory, that is, with loss aversion and risk-seeking behavior for losses.
Proposition 3
The time T optimal wealth of a loss-averse investor with prospect utility function (8) and risk aversion parameters 0 
where solves f( ) ϭ 0 with
and
We can prove that the terminal wealth profile has the following properties:
Proposition 4 Consider a loss-averse investor with prospect utility function (8), 0 Ͻ ␥ 1 Յ 1, 0 Ͻ ␥ 2 Ͻ 1, and loss aversion ratio A/B Ͼ 1. Let denote the breakpoint for his optimal wealth profile, and y the corresponding Lagrange multiplier (see Proposition 3).
(i) Suppose that the investor's level of loss aversion increases to A* Ͼ A. Let * denote the breakpoint of his new optimal wealth profile, and let y* denote the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. Then * Ͼ and y* Ͼ y. (ii) Suppose that the investor's initial wealth increases to W 0 * Ͼ W 0 . Let * denote the breakpoint of his new optimal wealth profile, and let y* denote the corresponding Lagrange multiplier. Then * Ͼ and y* Ͻ y.
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal wealth profile for the utility function of prospect theory is discontinuous: it is either above , or equal to 0. It is interesting to note that a payoff function that delivers in good states of the world and 0 otherwise is optimal for investors that maximize the probability of beating the target (Browne, 1999) . Hence, the optimal profile for prospect theory resembles a gambling policy. Figure 2 illustrates that the optimal wealth profiles for prospect theory and kinked power utility are similar in good states of the world, where a portfolio insurance strategy prevails. However, a difference arises in bad states of the world with (T) Ͼ : the wealth profile for prospect theory drops to 0 discontinuously due to the risk-seeking attitude toward losses, whereas the wealth profile for kinked power utility approaches 0 gradually. The optimal wealth profile for the utility function of prospect theory is also similar to the wealth profile of a CRRA investor constrained by a value-at-risk (VaR) limit, as derived by Basak and Shapiro (2001) . A VaR-constrained investor keeps his wealth above a given threshold in most states of the world, except in a small proportion of states where large losses are allowed to occur.
Proposition 4 shows that rising loss aversion (A* Ͼ A) increases the number of states with payoff above the threshold ( * Ͼ ). Some upside potential is lost as well, due to the simultaneous increase of the Lagrange multiplier (y* Ͼ y), which reduces wealth in good states. An increase of initial wealth (W 0 * Ͼ W 0 ) leads to an expansion of the insurance region ( * Ͼ ), combined with an increase of wealth in good states (y* Ͻ y). Hence, insurance is a normal good.
III. The Portfolio Weights of Loss-Averse Investors
In the previous section we characterized the optimal terminal wealth of loss-averse investors under general price processes. In this section we will derive closed-form solutions for the corresponding optimal portfolio weights when asset prices follow geometric Brownian motions: we assume that the interest rate r and the market price of risk () are constant.
A. Optimal Portfolio Weights for Kinked Power Utility
We derive the investment strategy of a loss-averse investor with a kinked power utility function. As we apply the martingale methodology, the optimal strategies are a function of the pricing kernel (t). Proposition 5 presents a closed-form solution for the optimal wealth and the portfolio weights in this form at time t Ͻ T.
Proposition 5
Consider an investor with a kinked power utility function (9). Assume ␥ Ͻ 1, A/B Ͼ 1, and r and are constants. Then:
(i) The optimal wealth of the investor at time 0 Յ t Ͻ T is given by
where N(⅐) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function and
with ϭ
(ii) The fraction of wealth invested in the risky assets is
where N(⅐) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function and (⅐) denotes the standard normal density function. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, from now on we assume that there is only one risky asset, representing stocks. Note that as wealth goes to 0 [that is, (t) goes to infinity] the fraction invested in stocks by the loss-averse investor with kinked power utility goes to 0 in order to avoid bankruptcy. As wealth goes to infinity [that is, (t) goes to 0], the optimal fraction invested in stocks tends to the optimal policy of an investor with smooth power utility. Figure 3 compares the optimal wealth and portfolio weight of a loss-averse investor with kinked power utility at an intermediate time 0 Ͻ t Ͻ T with the benchmark CRRA solution and the portfolio insurance policy. Figure 3A shows that the optimal wealth at time t of the loss-averse investor resembles a compromise between the security of portfolio insurance and the steep wealth profile of a CRRA investor. Figure 3B reveals that the optimal fraction invested in stocks is V-shaped for kinked power utility. In good states the investor behaves like a portfolio insurer, trying to establish a lower bound of on his terminal wealth (see Basak, 1995) . However, in bad states the portfolio insurance strategy is abandoned and the portfolio weight of stocks increases steadily. Figure 3B reveals that loss aversion reduces the portfolio weight of stocks in most states of the world, compared to the smooth power utility function. In the most likely states of the world at time t ϭ 0.5 (that is, with (t) near E[(t)] ϭ 0.98), the portfolio weight of stocks of a loss-averse investor with kinked power utility is 67%, given the interest rate of r ϭ 4.1% and Sharpe ratio ϭ 0.3. 2 The optimal weight of stocks for smooth power utility is 1136% and hence much larger.
B. Optimal Portfolio Weights for Loss Aversion
We will now derive the optimal portfolio weight for the utility function of prospect theory, to study the additional impact of a risk-seeking attitude toward losses.
Proposition 6 Consider a loss-averse investor with the utility function of prospect theory (8). Assume 0 Ͻ ␥ 1 Յ 1, 0 Ͻ ␥ 2 Ͻ 1, and r and are constants. Then:
(i) The optimal wealth of the investor at time 0 Յ t Ͻ T is given by 2 The remaining parameters are ␥1 ϭ ␥2 ϭ ␥ ϭ 0.88, A/B ϭ 2.25, ϭ 1, W 0 ϭ 1, and T ϭ 1. . Similarly, part B shows the optimal fraction invested in stocks. The parameters are t ϭ 0.5, T ϭ 1, r ϭ 4.08%, ϭ 0.30, ϭ 22%, ϭ W0 ϭ 1, ␥1 ϭ ␥2 ϭ ␥ ϭ 0.88, and A/B ϭ 2.25.
and where solves f( ) ϭ 0 with
where N(⅐) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function and (⅐) denotes the standard normal density function. Note that wealth and the fraction of stocks approach 0 as (t) goes to infinity in order to avoid bankruptcy. As (t) approaches 0, wealth goes to infinity and the stock weight converges to the solution for smooth power utility. Figure 3 further reveals that the optimal wealth profile and the investment strategy at time t Ͻ T for the utility function of prospect theory are very similar to the results for kinked power utility. The influence of the convex part of the utility function of prospect theory almost disappears intertemporally, as the optimal wealth at time t is a smooth function, comparable to the wealth function for kinked power utility.
Our results for the utility function of prospect theory are comparable to those of Gomes (2005) , apart from the fact that in the two-state framework of Gomes (2005) the optimal weight makes a discontinuous jump as the investor switches from the portfolio insurance strategy to a more risky strategy. The optimal investment strategy of a lossaverse investor also resembles the strategy of a CRRA agent constrained by a VaR limit (Basak & Shapiro, 2001 ). Both types of investors become more risk-averse when their wealth is near the reference point, but they switch to a risk-seeking gambling policy if wealth is sufficiently below the target level.
C. Dynamic Updating of the Reference Point
So far we have derived all results under the assumption that the investor has a constant reference point for distinguishing losses and gains. It seems more plausible that an investor will update his reference point through time, depending on the development of his wealth. Following Barberis et al. (2001) and Gomes (2005) , we will specify a dynamic updating rule for the reference point of a lossaverse investor and analyze its effect on optimal portfolio choice.
Let (t) denote the reference point of the investor at time t. We assume that the investor continuously adjusts his initial reference point (0) with the constant riskless rate r(0), weighted by 1 Ϫ ␣, and with the change of his wealth, dW(t), weighted by ␣. Hence, starting from time t ϭ 0, the investor's reference point evolves dynamically according to the following process:
By integration of equation (25) it follows that the reference point (T) at the investor's planning horizon T equals
The investor's reference point (T) at the planning horizon separates gains from losses in the utility function of prospect theory:
To solve the portfolio choice problem with a stochastic reference point (T), we first show that it is equivalent to a portfolio choice problem of a loss-averse investor with a nonstochastic reference point. After substituting the expression (26) for the reference point (T) into the utility function above and some straightforward algebra, we can rewrite the utility function as follows:
where * T (␣) is a nonstochastic constant depending on ␣, (0), W(0), r(0), and T. Equation (28) shows that the utility over final wealth of a loss-averse investor who dynamically updates his reference point with the rule (25) is identical to the utility over final wealth of a loss-averse investor with a constant reference point of * T (␣) and loss aversion level (A/B)(1 Ϫ ␣) ␥1Ϫ␥2 . Hence, to analyze the impact of an increase of the weight ␣, we may note that it is equivalent to a simultaneous shift in the level of loss aversion (A/B)(1 Ϫ ␣) ␥1Ϫ␥2 and the static reference point * T (␣) in equation (28). If ␥1 ϭ ␥2, then we can simplify the problem even further, as the constant (1 Ϫ ␣) ␥1 in equation (28) 
D. Time Diversification
An interesting question is whether loss-averse investors prefer to have a lower portfolio weight of stocks over time as they grow older, which is advocated by many practitioners. Figure 4 shows the initial stock fraction as a function of the planning horizon T for a loss-averse investor with a fixed reference point equal to initial wealth (solid line). The figure also displays the initial portfolio weight for a lossaverse investor who updates his reference point dynamically (dash-dotted line) and the initial portfolio weight for an investor with kinked power utility (dashed line). The initial portfolio weight of stocks is increasing as a function of the horizon T in all of these cases.
Note that the initial stock weight of a loss-averse investor is always larger than 100% in figure 4A , except for short planning horizons-those less than 6 months (T Ͻ 0.5). This result is due to the parameters used for the calculations-a Sharpe ratio of 0.30 and stock volatility of 22%-which imply a rather large equity risk premium of 6.6%. As the equity premium can make a huge difference for the initial portfolio weight of stocks, we also consider a more conservative case with an equity premium of only 2% (parameters: ϭ 0.1, ϭ 20%, and r ϭ 4%). Figure 4B shows that in this more moderate scenario for equities, the initial stock portfolio weight still increases with the planning horizon T, but at a less rapid rate than in the bullish scenario for equities. Moreover, the portfolio weight of the loss-averse investor with a dynamic threshold (dasheddotted line) is always considerably higher than the portfolio weight with a fixed threshold (solid line) in figure 4B .
The optimal equity weights of loss-averse investors in figure 4 agree with the popular advice, viz., to invest less in stocks as one gets older and the planning horizon gets This figure shows the initial portfolio weight of stocks as a function of the planning horizon T, for a loss-averse agent maximizing the utility function of prospect theory with fixed reference point (solid line) and with a dynamic reference point (dashed-dotted line), a loss-averse investor with a kinked power utility function (dashed line), and an investor with smooth power utility (dotted line). In part A the parameters are ␥1 ϭ ␥2 ϭ ␥ ϭ 0.88, A/B ϭ 2.25, ϭ W0 ϭ 1, r ϭ 4.08%, ϭ 0.30, and ϭ 22% (equity premium of 6.6%). In part B the parameters are the same, except r ϭ 4%, ϭ 0.1, and ϭ 20% (equity premium of 2%).
nearer. This result is not a complete surprise, as the investment strategy of loss-averse investors resembles a portfolio insurance strategy as long as wealth remains above the threshold. Portfolio insurers, such as investors with a HARA utility function (12), have decreasing relative risk aversion and also invest less in equity as they become older. Figure 5A compares the equity weight of a loss-averse investor with that of a portfolio insurer (solid and dotted line, respectively), given a fixed threshold equal to initial wealth.
If the initial wealth of a loss-averse investor is sufficiently below the threshold, risk aversion drops and the investment strategy becomes more risky than portfolio insurance. We expect this risk-taking behavior to diminish for longer planning horizons, as the investor has more time to make up his initial losing position. Figure 5B confirms this effect for a loss-averse investor with an initial threshold of 1.1 and initial wealth of 1.0: the stock weight decreases as a function of T initially and then starts to increase again, both for a fixed threshold (dotted line) and for a dynamically updated threshold with ␣ ϭ 0.5 (dashed line). We conclude that the initial stock weight of loss-averse investors tends to increase with the planning horizon, except when initial wealth is below the threshold and the investor tries to gamble his way out of the losing position.
IV. Empirical Investigation of Aggregate Investor Loss Aversion
In experimental studies, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) find evidence for strong loss aversion. Specifically, their value function is approximately piecewise linear, with a slope of 2.25 for losses and a slope of 1 for gains (see figure  1) . There is probably a wide gap between choice behavior in small-scale psychological experiments and real-life investor risk preferences, for example because the experiments typically involve only small sums of money and the market mechanism is absent. Still, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) demonstrate that Tversky and Kahneman's level of loss aversion can explain the equity premium, using historical U.S. stock market returns (without rescaling of the probabilities) and an evaluation period of 1 year. 3 In this section, we will estimate which level of loss aversion best describes historical returns. For this purpose, we develop a simple single-period model of a competitive and frictionless capital market with a loss-averse representative agent. This model gives a straightforward measure of investor loss aversion, given that the curvature (risk aversion) of the utility function is known. We analyze this measure for annual U.S. stock return data. Second, we also jointly estimate loss aversion and risk aversion for the kinked power utility function with the GMM. Note that we drop the assumption of continuous-time trading in this section. So far we have used continuous-time finance to derive explicit solutions for the optimal portfolio choice problem. However, we believe that a discrete-time model is more appropriate for empirical estimation.
In our empirical investigation we focus solely on the kinked power utility specification, and not the value function of prospect theory. Our main reason is that the kinked power function is more general, encompassing as extreme cases both a smooth concave power utility function and a piecewise linear function with a kink. Hence, estimation of the kinked power specification allows us to test whether risk aversion and/or loss aversion provides a good description of U.S. stock returns. The value function of prospect theory is more limited in its scope: the risk aversion parameter ␥2 for gains is restricted to be greater than 0, as the function would become discontinuous in the reference point (and hence meaningless) otherwise. Note that the restriction ␥2 Ͼ 0 implies less risk aversion than a log investor, and risk aversion can therefore not be fully explored as an alternative explanation or hypothesis given the specification of the value function.
A. One-Period Discrete-Time Representative Agent Model
We consider a single-period, portfolio-based, representative agent model that satisfies the following assumptions. The model consists of one period from time 0 until the planning horizon T. The investment universe consists of K risky assets and a riskless asset. The risk-free rate for the given period is denoted by r 0 , and the returns of the risky assets are denoted by r k . The returns r k are random variables with a continuous joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) G:
The representative agent constructs a portfolio by choosing portfolio weights w k for the assets, in order to maximize the utility U(W(T)) of wealth W(T) at the planning horizon. The utility function is the kinked power specification considered previously. Without loss of generality, we set B: ϭ 1 and we assume that the reference point is equal to
where r denotes the K ϫ 1 random vector of one-period asset returns r k , w denotes the K ϫ 1 vector of portfolio weights w k , and denotes a K ϫ 1 vector of 1's. Because we use a representative agent model, the valueweighted market portfolio of risky assets, denoted by the vector of weights w M , is the optimal solution to the problem (30). Given the concave shape of the kinked power function and the assumption that the terminal wealth generated by the market portfolio is always strictly positive at time T, it follows that w M satisfies the following condition for optimality:
For ease of exposition we define e M as the excess return of the market portfolio, that is, e M : ϭ (r Ϫ r 0 )Јw M . After weighting all assets with their market capitalization, we find
We can then derive the following expression for the loss aversion parameter A:
In other words, given the risk aversion parameter ␥, we can derive the loss aversion parameter directly from the upside and downside probability distribution of the market portfolio's returns.
B. Empirical Loss Aversion Estimator
In empirical applications the CDF G(r ) generally is unknown and the available information is typically limited to a discrete set of time series observations r t ϭ (r 0t , r 1t , r 2t , . . ., r Kt ) for t ϭ 1, 2, . . ., N. We sort and label the observations based on the excess return of the market portfolio, that is,
, and use N L and N G for the numbers of negative and positive excess returns respectively. Using the observations, we can construct the following sample equivalent of equation (33):
If the observations are serially identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) random draws from the CDF, then the sample equivalent gives a statistically consistent estimator Â for the loss aversion parameter A. We proxy the market portfolio by the value-weighted Fama-French portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. We use yearly excess returns for the period from 1927 to 2002. As discussed in Benartzi and Thaler (1995, p. 83 ), 1 year is a plausible choice for the investor's evaluation period, because "individual investors file taxes annually, receive their most comprehensive reports from their brokers, mutual funds, and retirement accounts once a year, and institutional investors also take the annual reports most seriously." Excess returns are computed relative to the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. All data used in our study are obtained from the data library on the home page of Kenneth French.
As a first case, we consider the piecewise linear lossaverse specification with ␥ ϭ 1, and we find that the loss aversion estimator Â takes on a value of 2.50. Interestingly, this estimate is only slightly above the value 2.25 found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and slightly below the value 2.77 reported by Benartzi and Thaler (1995, p. 83) . A piecewise linear utility function can lead to very extreme investment strategies, as demonstrated by Ait-Sahalia and Brandt (2001), and therefore we do not consider it a realistic model for preferences. However, the estimate for ␥ ϭ 1 is still interesting, as it is a proxy for the maximum level of loss aversion consistent with the data. When we increase the coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 Ϫ ␥ of the kinked power function above 0, one would expect the loss aversion estimate Â to decrease. Figure 6 shows the point estimate Â as a function of the level of relative risk aversion 1 Ϫ ␥.
It is clear from figure 6 that assuming a higher level of relative risk aversion leads to considerably lower loss aversion estimates. At levels of relative risk aversion above 1.77, the point estimate for loss aversion even drops below 1. We learn from these results that loss aversion and risk aversion are substitutes. Quoting Benartzi and Thaler (1995, pp. 85-86) : "Loss aversion plays the role of risk aversion in standard models, . . .."
C. GMM Estimation of Loss Aversion and Risk Aversion
As the concave curvature (or risk aversion) assumed for the kinked power function has a serious impact on the loss aversion estimate, we will now estimate the risk aversion parameter ␥ and the loss aversion parameter A simultaneously for a set of benchmark portfolios with GMM. We first construct the sample equivalent of the first-order condition (31):
The GMM estimator selects parameter estimates so that the pricing errors m(A, ␥) are as close to 0 as possible, as defined by the criterion function
where W(A, ␥) is a weighting matrix. In this study, we set the weighting matrix equal to the inverse of the covariance matrix of the pricing errors, that is,
, and we use the continuous-updating method, which continuously alters W(A, ␥) as A and ␥ are changed in the minimization (see Hansen, Heaton, & Yaron, 1996) . Note that the Fama-French market portfolio returns are not sufficient to identify two preference parameters jointly, and we therefore have to use a larger set of assets k ϭ 1, 2, . . ., K. We use three different sets of benchmark portfolios as instruments for the estimation: the ten CRSP decile portfolios based on market capitalization (ME1,. . ., ME10), the ten decile portfolios formed on the book-to-market ratio (B/M1,. . ., B/M10), and ten portfolios formed on industry classifi cation (NoDur,. . ., Other). Again, we use excess returns from 1927 to 2002 (76 years), obtained from the data library on the home page of Kenneth French. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the excess returns of the market portfolio and the benchmark portfolios. Table 2 displays the results of the GMM estimation of the kinked power utility function. The first row of results in table 2 refers to the joint estimation of A and ␥, the second row displays the estimated loss aversion A for a piecewise linear function (with ␥ ϭ 1), and the third row displays estimated risk aversion ␥ for a smooth power function (with A ϭ 1). The two-parameter kinked utility specification has a good fit for the size portfolios (J ϭ 0.084, p ϭ 0.60). By contrast, we must reject the model at a significance level of 10% for the B/M portfolios (J ϭ 0.241, p ϭ 0.02) and the industry portfolios (J ϭ 0.245, p ϭ 0.02). Note that the B/M portfolios and the industry portfolios cannot be explained fully by any of the three utility specifications at the 10% level. Possibly, this reflects the time variation of the return distribution of the B/M and industry portfolios. A follow-up inspection revealed that the market betas of some of these portfolios change substantially during the course of the business cycle; value stocks and cyclical industries appear to increase during recessions. This cyclical time variation may explain why our unconditional model does not capture the returns of value and industry portfolios. 5 By contrast, the betas of the size portfolios appeared very stable. Anyway, we must reject the null that the market portfolio is optimal relative to the B/M portfolios and the industry portfolios, violating the underlying assumption of the equilibrium model. For this reason, we concentrate on the results for the size portfolios, which can be explained well by all of the three models.
Inspecting the estimated coefficients for the size portfolios, the main conclusion is that we generally cannot disentangle risk aversion and loss aversion. If we include both explanations, then the estimates for loss aversion and risk aversion are not significant at the 10% level. By contrast, if we include only one explanation (risk aversion or loss aversion), then the model achieves roughly the same goodness of fit and the single utility coefficient (either A or ␥) becomes significant. Again, the loss aversion estimate of 2.711 for the piecewise linear specification is of the same order of magnitude as the estimates in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) . In addition, we find again that increasing the level of curvature (risk aversion) reduces the level of loss aversion.
V. Conclusions
We find that loss aversion has a substantial effect on the optimal investment strategy. The investor with a kinked power utility function follows a partial portfolio insurance strategy, as he or she would like to keep wealth above the reference point at the planning horizon. The investor has to give up some wealth in good states of the world in order to achieve this (compared to an investor without loss aversion). When the planning horizon of the investor is short (less than 5 years), the partial portfolio insurance strategy considerably reduces the initial portfolio weight of stocks, compared to the portfolio of an investor with smooth power utility.
Consistent with popular investment advice, we find that the initial portfolio weight of stocks of a loss-averse investor typically increases with the investment horizon. For longer planning horizons, the initial strategy of an investor with kinked power utility converges to the portfolio of an investor with smooth power utility. An investor with a long planning horizon has time to make up his losses, and this allows him to invest aggressively in stocks initially. However, as the planning horizon comes nearer, an investment in stocks might lead to considerable losses below the reference point, and the investor tries to limit these losses with a portfolio insurance strategy. *Yearly excess returns (January to December) for the value-weighted Fama-French market portfolio (FFM), the ten size decile portfolios (ME1,. . ., ME10), the ten BE/ME portfolios (B/M1,. . ., B/M10), and the industry portfolios (NoDur,. . ., Other). Descriptive statistics are computed for the full sample from 1927 to 2002. Excess returns are computed by subtracting the return on the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill. The return data are obtained from the data library of Kenneth French (stocks) and from Ibbotsons (T-bills).
The empirical section of the paper investigates whether the loss aversion parameter estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) with psychological experiments is consistent with actual U.S. stock market data. For this purpose we derive a simple estimator of aggregate loss aversion from a one-period representative agent model. We find that the estimate of aggregate loss aversion implied by yearly U.S. stock market returns is quite close to the value 2.25 reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the value 2.77 reported by Benartzi and Thaler (1995, p. 83) , as long as the curvature of the utility function is sufficiently low. We also estimate the risk aversion parameter and the loss aversion parameter of a kinked power utility function simultaneously, using various sets of U.S. benchmark portfolios with GMM. In this case, we cannot disentangle loss aversion and risk aversion. These explanations seem to be close substitutes for rationalizing empirical return data. Further, the GMM estimate for the loss aversion coefficient when estimated in isolation is again consistent with the estimates of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) .
APPENDIX A
Mathematical Proofs
In the proof of propositions 1 and 3 we follow the steps of the method implemented by Basak and Shapiro (2001) to solve nonstandard dynamic problems, in particular with nonconcave and nondifferentiable features.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: First the Legendre-Fenchel transform (or convex conjugate) for the problem (10) is defined as
where (T) Ն 0 denotes the pricing kernel. Let us denote the part of the utility function below by U 1 (W), and the part above by U 2 (W). Let W * j denote the optimal wealth profile for the utility function U j (W) for j ϭ 1, 2. The utility functions U 1 (W) and U 2 (W) are concave, and therefore W * j should satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
where j denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the nonnegativity constraint on wealth. After solving the KKT conditions, we obtain the following local maxima:
We compare the local maxima W * 1 and W * 2 in order to determine the global maximum. If
then the optimal solution is given by W * 2 . We define : ϭ A y ␥Ϫ1 and : ϭ B y ␥Ϫ1 . For Յ (T) Յ , note that W * 1 ϭ W * 2 ϭ , and hence in this case is the only candidate solution and hence optimal. For (T) Ͼ we have to compare the candidate solutions W * 1 ϭ (A/y(T)) 1/(1Ϫ␥) and W * 2 ϭ . The function f ((T)) in this case is
It is straightforward to verify that f ( ) ϭ 0, f Ј( ) ϭ 0, and f Љ((T)) Ͻ 0 for all (T) Ն . As a result, the inequality f ((T)) Ͻ 0, holds for all (T) Ͼ . Hence, W* 1 ϭ [A/y(T)] 1/(1Ϫ␥) is the optimal level of wealth for (T) Ͼ . For (T) Ͻ we have to compare the candidate solutions W * 1 ϭ and W * 2 ϭ [B/y(T)] 1/(1Ϫ␥) . The function f ((T)) in this case is
It is straightforward to verify that f () ϭ 0, f Ј() ϭ 0, and f Љ((T)) Ͼ 0 for all (T) Յ . As a result, the inequality f ((T)) Ͼ 0 holds for all (T) Ͻ . Hence, W * 2 ϭ [B/y(T)] 1/(1 Ϫ␥) is the optimal level of wealth for (T) Ͻ .
We denote the optimal solution of equation (A1) by W *(T). Let W(T) represent any other possible optimal solution satisfying the static budget equation (10). The following result can be derived (see Shreve, 1998, and Basak & Shapiro, 2001) : The first inequality follows from the fact that the static budget equation holds with equality for W *(T) and with inequality for W(T). The second inequality holds because W *(T) is the optimal solution of the problem (A1). We conclude that W *(T) is the optimal solution of the static investment problem (10) with a kinked power utility function. This concludes the proof. Note that the entire optimal wealth profile W(T) shifts to the left. As a result, the constraint E((T)W(T)) ϭ 0 W 0 cannot be satisfied anymore, and therefore the assumption * Ϫ * Յ Ϫ is not valid. We conclude * Ϫ * Ͼ Ϫ holds. (ii): Due to the increase of W 0 * Ͼ W 0 , the Lagrange multiplier y* Ͻ y decreases and the optimal wealth profile W(T) shifts to the right (with y* Ն y it would be impossible to satisfy the initial budget constraint). The inequalities * Ͼ , * Ͼ , and * Ϫ * Ͼ Ϫ follow from y* Ͻ y.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1, apart from the convexity of the utility function of prospect theory in the domain of losses. The utility function of prospect theory is strictly increasing and hence pseudoconcave [proof available on request; we refer to Avriel et al. (1988) for more information on pseudoconcave functions]. As a result the static investment problem (10) has an optimal solution in this case, and we can find it by solving the first-order conditions (see Seierstadt & Sydsaeter, 1987 
Because B Ͼ 0, y Ͼ 0, and 0 Ͻ ␥2 Ͻ 1, it is not difficult to verify that f ((T)) Ͼ 0 holds for all (T). Hence, W * 1 ϭ is never the optimal level of wealth. When we compare W * 2 with W * 1 ϭ 0, we find
Because A Ͼ B Ͼ 0, y Ͼ 0, and 0 Ͻ ␥2 Ͻ 1, it is straightforward to verify that f ((T)) Ͼ 0 holds for ͑T͒ Յ A y ␥1Ϫ1 . Moreover, lim x3ϩϱ f (x) ϭ Ϫϱ.
As f Ј((T)) Ͻ 0 holds for all (T), the function f is strictly decreasing. Putting all this information about the continuous function f together, we can now conclude that f ((T)) has exactly one zero in the interval ͩ A y ␥1Ϫ1 , ϩ ϱͪ. We denote this point by , with f ( ) ϭ 0. Given that f is strictly decreasing, f ((T)) Ͼ 0 for (T) Ͻ and f ((T)) Յ 0 for (T) Ն . Hence, W * 2 is optimal for (T) Ͻ , and W * 1 ϭ 0 is optimal for (T) Ն . We denote the optimal solution of equation (A10) by W *(T). Applying a line of reasoning like that in the proof of proposition 1, we conclude that the optimal solution to the static optimization problem with the utility of prospect theory is given by equation (13 
and a y* Ն 0 that satisfies E[(T)W(T)] ϭ 0 W 0 . Equivalently, we might look for a zero z* ϭ * y* of the equation g(z):
and a y* Ն 0 that satisfies E[(T)W(T)] ϭ 0 W 0 .
